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Use of hospital services and socio-economic status in urban India 
Does health insurance ensure equitable outcomes? 
 
Detailed Abstract 
High out of pocket expenditure incurred while seeking medical services is one of 
the major reasons for inequitable access to health care. This calls for the introduction of 
universal health care policies. Designing and introducing such policies requires, inter alia, 
an understanding of the relationship between health and socio-economic status (SES). 
Unfortunately this relationship is difficult to determine empirically because 
asymmetric information creates a principal-agent relationship between the patient and the 
health care provider, leading to moral hazard problems. Thus, ‘induced demand’ may 
distort the health-SES gradient. Theoretical literature suggests that actions of the patient – 
other than health seeking behavior – may act to reduce the inefficiencies in the health 
care markets. Such activities, like purchasing health insurance, are referred to as 
‘compliances’. However, introducing health insurance into the decision-making 
framework also opens the door for moral hazard on the part of the patient, as they may be 
willing to seek health care even if strictly not required. This creates a double moral 
hazard – reinforcing the original moral hazard problem created by the physician induced 
demand for health care. Further, patients who believe that they are more likely to seek 
health care treatment may be the ones who undertake compliances in the form of 
purchasing health insurance (adverse selection). 
This paper examines these issues empirically in the context of India, using unit 
level data from the NSSO “Morbidity and Health Care” survey. The study seeks to 
identify determinants of hospitalization. We find that – contrary to existing empirical 
literature – SES is as an important determinant of usage of hospitalization services even 
in the presence of compliances. However, results of a simultaneous equation model 
reveal that moral hazard and adverse selection may accentuate existing health inequities.  
Results of a simultaneous equation model reveal the dual existence of moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in health care seeking behaviour in the presence of 
health insurance. This contracts the market for health insurance (by keeping insurance 
premium high), and accentuates the SES-linked inequalities in usage of hospitalization 
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services. The paper argues that this market failure is matched by state failure in the form 
of failing to provide universal health coverage to the socio-economically vulnerable 
sections of the population. 
 
Short Abstract 
In recent years universal health coverage has become an important issue in developing 
countries. Successful introduction of such a social security system requires knowledge of 
the relationship between socio-economic status and usage of health care services. This 
paper examines this relationship, and analyzes the impact of introducing health 
insurance into the model, using data for India, a major developing country with poor 
health outcomes. In contrast to similar works undertaken for developed countries, results 
of the instrumental variable model estimated reveals that the positive relation between 
usage of in-patient services and socio-economic status persists even in the presence of 
health insurance. This implies that insurance is unable to eliminate the inequities in 
accessing health care services stemming from disparities in socio-economic status. In 
fact, the presence of a double moral hazard and adverse selection leads to further 
attenuation of inequity in the health care market. The study is based on unit level data 
from the “Morbidity and Health Care Survey” undertaken by the National Sample Survey 
Organization (2005-06). 
 
Keywords: Hospitalization; Health insurance; Strategic independence; Simultaneous 
equation system; SES-health gradient; India. 
JEL:  
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Use of hospital services and socio-economic status in urban India  
Does health insurance ensure equitable outcomes? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The challenge to the health care system is to make health care equitable and sustainable 
in terms of efficient use of resources as well as in terms of its financing (Van Doorslaer et 
al., 1993; Cuyler and Wagstaff, 1993; Hurley, 2000; Oliver and Mossialos, 2008). 
Increased access to health care based on need can promote equity and also achieve 
efficiency through a reduction of per capita health care costs (Routh et al., 2004). 
However, on one hand, under-utilization of health services (Wurthwein et al., 2001) and, 
on the other hand, continuous increase in out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses resulting in  
impoverishment of the poor (Xu et al., 2003; Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003; Berman et 
al., 2010; Ghosh, 2011; Selvaraj and Karan, 2012) have remained longstanding problems 
in the developing economies.  
Access to health care services is relatively universal in the developed countries and the 
importance of income in determining the demand for health care has undergone some 
dilution mainly due to third party payments (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Somers, 1986; 
Pappas et al., 1993 and Guralnik et al., 1993). The situation is different for the developing 
countries with reliance on out-of-pocket payments which is inefficient and less 
accountable than other methods of financing. It is also iniquitous to the poor on whom the 
disease burden falls disproportionately more, who are more susceptible to disease and 
who are more likely to be pushed into poverty trap (Gumber, 1997; Visaria and Gumber, 
1994). A World Bank study notes that people are forced to adopt costly strategies to meet 
health care expenditure – 40 percent are forced to take loans or sell assets to finance OOP 
(Peters et al., 2002; see also Karuna Trust, 2003). 
The picture is not different in India with nearly 80 percent of the health care expenditures 
borne by the individuals and a mere 0.9 percent funding by the Government. Peters et al. 
(2002) reports that one-fourth of Indians slip below the poverty line as a result of hospital 
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stay.1 Thus, high OOP is one of the major reasons for inequitable access to health care in 
India. This calls for the introduction of universal health coverage (Mahal and Fan, 2011) 
or, at least, policies spreading health care costs more equitably across the population, 
improving access to health services and reducing households from falling below the 
poverty line due to catastrophic healthcare expenditures. Designing and introducing such 
policies requires, inter alia, an understanding of the relationship between health care 
seeking behavior and socio-economic status (SES) (GOI, 2011 Kuate-Defo, 1997) – 
referred to as the health-SES gradient in literature. The reason is that resources are 
limited in developing countries. In such cases, identification of economically vulnerable 
communities deprived of access to health facilities and characterized by poor health 
outcomes across several counts will enable optimal use of limited resources through 
targeting. 
Such understanding, however, is obscured by the existence of information related 
externalities in the health market. These externalities typically create a principal-agent 
problem in the health care market, resulting in moral hazard2 – so that an inefficient 
health outcome is generated. In such a situation, the presence of compliances - health 
related efforts of the patient like defensive expenditure, seeking insurance coverage, etc - 
may potentially act to lead the market back to an efficient outcome. Empirical studies of 
health care seeking behavior in developed countries have shown that such compliances 
may reduce the influence of socio-economic status on health status. This implies that 
health care inequities are reduced by compliances, an important form of which is health 
insurance.  
 
Unfortunately, such studies cover the experience of only developed countries. Although 
there is a large body of literature on the importance of health insurance in reducing 
inequities in health market outcomes (Ahuja, 2004; Ahuja and De, 2004; GOI, 2005; 
Mahal and Fan, 2011), studies exploring the health-SES gradient in the presence of health 
insurance are lacking for India. The present study is an attempt to remedy this deficiency. 
                                               
1 A recent study estimates that health care seeking behavior led poverty head count ratio to increase by 3.5 
percent in India (Shahrawat and Rao, 2012).  
2 Moral hazard refers to a situation wherein incentives encourage an individual to maximize his objective 
function, at the cost of social welfare. 
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The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between health and SES, and 
analyze how the introduction of compliances in the framework affects this relationship.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical structure 
underlying the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the database used in the study, and 
explaining the methodology adopted. Findings are presented and analyzed in the next 
section. We initially look at the health-SES gradient in the absence of compliances. 
Subsequently, this is extended by incorporating the possibility of purchasing health 
insurance. Findings and policy conclusions are summed up in a concluding section. 
 
2. Background  
The health care market is characterized by information asymmetries between the patient 
and physician, resulting in a principal-agent relationship. This often distorts the 
potentially simple monotonic relationship between SES and usage of health services. For 
instance, researchers have argued that the demand for medical care is an induced 
preference (Feldstein, 1977), where physicians’ interest, peer pressure and ethical 
concern play an important role in shaping the usage of health care. Hence, there is a 
possibility that, guided by physicians, the patients end up in purchasing services more 
than they actually require, or can afford. This may result in moral hazard.3 
 
 Now, in patient-physician relationship, patients (who are considered as principal) also 
have some choice variables (compliances) that may substantially affect the use of health 
care services. Now, in situations where the patient cannot evaluate the worth of the 
physician’s advice and the physician does not possess exact information about the 
treatment seeking behaviour of the patient, compliances can play an important role in 
ensuring efficient health care seeking behavior. This, in turn, provides scope for entry of 
“complementary agents” into the market for health care services affecting the physician-
patient relationship. An important instance of such complementary agents is companies 
providing health insurance. Such companies play the role of mediator in the contractual 
                                               
3 In the absence of complete information it is often difficult to identify such cases of demand enhancement. 
Further, this phenomenon may not be as common as normally presumed (Kramer and Fuchs, 1972; 
Reinhardt, 1985, Pauly, 1968; Bardey and Lesur, 2004). 
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arrangements between the two key participants of the health care sector, physicians and 
patients (Gaynor, 1994; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000), and result in individual actions - 
like the demand for medical care, the consumption of health care goods and its financing 
– becoming different from what is theorized in the absence of insurance companies. 
Specifically, it has been shown that incorporating insurance companies in an otherwise 
exclusive physician-patient relationship reduce the problem of mutual asymmetric 
information between the actions of physicians and patients (Selden, 1990; Blomqvist, 
1991; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Ma and McGuire, 1997; Kim and Wang, 1998). This 
leads to more efficient health outcomes. Simultaneously, such compliances reduce the 
importance of SES in determining usage of health care services (Becker, 1964; Guralnik 
et al., 1993; Mincer, 1974; Pappas et al., 1993; Somers, 1986). This implies that 
outcomes will be more equitable, as even people with poor SES can access quality health 
care facilities (Balarajan et al., 2011; Glazier et al., 2009).4 
 
However, the introduction of compliances may also have an adverse impact on the 
outcome. The presence of compliances means that the patient too is participating in the 
‘production’ of health. Literature on principal-agent relations show that, in such cases, a 
double moral hazard may emerge (Bhattacharya and Lafontaine, 1995; Cooper and Ross, 
1985; Demski and Sappington, 1991). Specifically, in the health market, this may lead 
insured patients to seek treatment even when such treatment is not essential. This 
tendency may be encouraged by physicians (the moral hazard problem discussed earlier), 
so that we get a double moral hazard effect. Simultaneously, as demonstrated by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the presence of asymmetric information in the insurance 
market may lead to an adverse selection problem. 5  This has also been verified by 
empirical studies on health insurance (Belli, 2001; Browne, 1992; Conrad et al., 1985; 
Cutler and Zekhauser, 1998; di Novi, 2008; Wright, 2010). Both these processes may 
operate together so that an inefficient and inequitable equilibrium results (Markova 2006; 
Wallace, 2002). 
                                               
4 Richardon et al. (2012), however, points out that barriers to accessing health services remained even after 
the introduction of mandatory social health insurance coverage in Moldovia. 
5 Adverse selection is "the tendency of high risks to be more likely to buy insurance or to buy larger 
amounts than low risks" (Cummins, et al., 1982). This results from an asymmetry in market information in 
favor of the buyer of insurance. 
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Thus, theoretical and empirical literature fails to provide a conclusive answer as to how 
health insurance will affect the health-SES gradient. At an obvious level, the answer 
depends upon (for theoretical studies) on the nature of construct and its underlying 
construct, and (for empirical situations) on the contextual situation. This motivates us to 
examine the nature of the health-SES gradient in India, a growing developing country 
with poor health indicators and low per capita public spending on health, and analyze the 
impact of compliances on this relationship. 
 
The focus is on in-patient services in India - first in the absence and then in presence of 
compliances (in the form of health insurance). The rationale behind the estimation of the 
former model is to check the role of SES in determining the usage of health care services. 
Only one dimension of moral hazard, emanating from the physician’s side, will be 
present. In the second step, we introduce health insurance, dropping the implicit 
assumption of strategic independence between compliances and usage of in-patient 
services. Our objective is to test for the existence of distortions produced by compliances. 
One of the causes of this distortion is to produce endogenity through a two-way relation 
between hospitalization and insurance purchase. The measurement of usage of hospital 
services in the presence of this endogenity helps to analyze whether there is a possibility 
of moral hazard and/or adverse selection and whether health-SES gradient is distorted by 
such market failures. 
 
2. DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Database 
This study is based on unit level National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization data for the 
60th round (“Morbidity and Health care”). The data was collected through an all-India 
survey undertaken from January to June 2004. Using multi stage sampling for the rural 
and the urban areas the survey covered 199 million households, comprising 959 million 
individuals. Respondents were interviewed using a close ended questionnaire.  
 
2.2 SES, Hospitalization and Insurance 
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One of the most important determinant of hospitalization is socio-economic status (SES) 
of the individual. A high SES has two counteracting forces on the demand for health 
(Grossman, 1972b; Grossman, 2000). On the one hand it increases the value of available 
healthy time and hence the incentive to maintain health capital. On the other hand it 
makes own time for producing gross investments in health more costly, thereby reducing 
the demand for health. The net effect is to make the demand for health positively 
correlated with SES of individuals. With an increase in third party insurance coverage, 
however, the importance of SES in determining medical care demand has diminished 
(Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Somers, 1986; Pappas et al., 1993 and Guralnik et al., 
1993).  
 
Since the objective of this analysis is to analyse the relationship between SES and 
hospitalization usage, and examine the impact of insurance on this relationship, let us 
briefly look at what NSS data shows.  
 
NSS does not collect information on income, but on monthly household expenditure. The 
60th Round collects information on consumption expenditure incurred over the last 30 
days preceding the survey out of purchase, home produced stock, receipts in exchange of 
goods and services, gifts and loans and free collection. This is annualized, , and converted 
to log values (LPCE).  
 
Among other variables capturing socio-economic status are education (Grossman, 1975; 
Wagstaff, 1986b; Kemna, 1987; Van Doorslaer, 1987; Arkes, 2004; Oreopoulas, 2006) 
and occupation (Economou et al., 2008; Cohen and Sinding, 1996). Although NSS gives 
this information for all individuals, we have used education and occupation for the 
household head, who is the decision-maker. The educational level is recoded into five 
categories —   no education (comprising illiterate and with informal education, HILLIT), 
below primary (those who have less than five years of schooling, HBPRIM), primary 
(comprising those who have completed primary level, but have less than 10 years of 
schooling, HPRIM), secondary (those who have completed 10 years of schooling, HSEC) 
and the remaining persons (who have at least 12 years of education, HHSEC).  
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The information on occupation has been recoded using the National Classification of 
Occupation (1968). In all eight categories were formed — professional (HPRF), 
administrative workers (HADMIN), clerks (HCLERK), service sector workers 
(HSERVICE), sales(wo)men (HSALES), workers engaged in manufacturing (HMANF), 
and primary sector workers (HPSECTOR). All remaining household heads were clubbed 
in a residual category (HOTHERS). 
 
Information on insurance premium paid is also provided. This is recoded to obtain a 
binary variable indicating whether the respondent is covered under insurance or not 
(BINS). In this context, it should be noted that though NSS collects data on premium paid 
for private health insurance and Government health schemes, we use the information on 
only the former. This is because coverage under Government health scheme is 
compulsory and does not constitute compliances.  
 
Finally, information on usage of in-patient and out-patient medical services in any health 
facility is given. The reference periods are 365 days and 15 days preceding survey, 
respectively. We have considered only in-patient services, coding it in binary form to 
identify whether the respondent has availed of in-patient services, or not. The focus on in-
patient services, as compared to out-patient services, is justified on the grounds that the 
former – though less frequent – imposes higher costs (both monetary and opportunity) on 
the individual and the household. This is a major problem in developing countries, with 
poor social security networks, where hospitalization may lead to “catastrophic 
expenditure” (Wagstaff, 2006; Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2003). Moreover, in India, only 
inpatient services are presently covered under health insurance.  
 
This study is based on only the urban sample. This may be justified on the negligible 
coverage of rural households under insurance schemes. In urban areas, out of 132,563 
incidents of admission to hospital services, only 2.86 were covered under any form of 
insurance and 0.99 under private insurance. Corresponding figures are even lower in rural 
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areas, 1.65 percent and 0.61 percent, respectively, so that analysis does not yield any 
useful results. So we retained only 34.58 percent of the total sample of 383,338 cases. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
The paper is based on multi-variate regression analysis, directed towards deriving the 
relationship between SES (expenditure, and household head’s education and occupation) 
and usage of hospitalization services, controlling for socio-demographic factors (namely 
age, socio-religious identity and gender of respondent, gender of household head, and 
household size), living environment6 and accessibility to hospital services (per capita 
hospital beds).  
 
Now the study variable is whether the respondent has been hospitalized in the 365 days 
preceding the survey, or not. As this is a binary variable, the equations may be estimated 
using either logit or probit models. In the first (basic) model, where there are no 
compliances, estimation has been done using a single equation probit model, as both logit 
and probit variants have been known to give similar results. 
 
In the second model we extended the basic model by introducing compliances in the form 
of health insurance. Now health insurance policies may lead to a trade off between risk 
sharing and agency problems. This leads to either moral hazard7 (the incentive to seek 
more health care by the insured) or adverse selection8 (the tendency of the sick to choose 
more generous insurance than the healthy), 9  or both – affecting the outcome of 
compliance efforts. In econometric terms, if adverse selection exists, persons expecting to 
be hospitalized in the future are more likely to purchase health insurance, i.e.  
                                               
6 The variable ‘living environment’ is the score from factor analysis undertaken on variables indicating 
structure of house, quality of drinking water (based on combination of source of drinking water and nature 
of its treatment), type of drainage and sanitation, and source of energy. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
test for data adequacy (0.7644) indicate that Factor Analysis is permissible; the eigen value is 2.29, 
capturing 45.76% of the variation. Normalized scores (ranging from 0 to 100) are used in the econometric 
analysis. High scores indicate healthier living conditions. 
7 Given a choice situation, asymmetry of information encourages an individual to maximize her personal 
behaviour at the cost of other persons, by behaving ‘inappropriately’. 
8 Given uncertainty due to asymmetric information, an individual takes a sub-optimal decision. 
9 In addition, we can also have the problem of supply-induced demand (the incentive of the physicians to 
refer insured patients for hospital admission).  
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Insurance = f (Hospitalization).   [1] 
On the other hand, in the presence of moral hazard, an existing policy holder is more 
likely to seek health care, including inpatient services. This implies : 
   Hospitalization = g (Insurance).   [2] 
This simultaneity, or endogenity, calls for introducing the instrumental variable method. 
The entire discussion is based on a probit model. 
 
In this paper, we have estimated two simultaneous equation models. The first model is an 
extension of the basic SES-hospitalization model supplemented by compliances. This 
model tests for moral hazard. This calls for first regressing decision to purchase insurance 
on an instrumental variable, LPCE and appropriate control variables (demographic 
variables and traits of household head), followed by regressing decision to seek hopsital 
services on estimated probability of purchasing insurance (derived from the first stage 
model), LPCE and the control variables used in the basic model.  
 
In an instrumental variable method, choice of the instrument is very important – the 
better the instrument, stronger will be the results. The instrument should be related to 
decision to purchase insurance, but not affect hospitalization. In this paper we have used 
magnitude of loss in household income due to hospitalization. This follows from the 
permanent income hypothesis, which states that choices made by consumers regarding 
their consumption patterns are determined not by current income but by their longer-term 
income expectations. This implies that transitory, short-term changes in income may have 
little effect on consumer spending behavior, as consumers may adopt strategies for 
consumption smoothening in the face of short run transitory shocks. This has also been 
observed for health shocks, wherein households will seek protection against loss of 
current disposable income by purchasing health insurance (Folland et al., 2006). Such 
loss, however, need not affect current hospitalization usage.10  
 
As noted previously, the introduction of compliances into decision-making creates 
another information-related market failure – adverse selection – that now affects outcome 
                                               
10 Correlation between loss in income due to hospitalization and hospitalization is 0.0125. 
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in the market for health care. This can be detected from the regression model of the 
decision to purchase health insurance. In the second two-stage model we first estimate: 
  HOSP = f (Instrument, LPCE, Control variables).   [3] 
The estimated probablity of being hospitalized is plugged into the insurance model: 
INSURANCE = g (PHOSP, LPCE, Control variables)  [4] 
where PHOSP indicates estimated probablity of being hospitalized. The instruments here 
are accessibility of hospital services measured by per capita beds, which determines 
usage of inpatient services but does not affect insurance coverage, and whether 
respondent had been ill in 15 days preceding survey.  
 
The control variables in the HOSP regression are: age and gender of respondent, socio-
religious identity, traits of household head (gender, education and occupation) and living 
environment. In the INSURANCE equation, the control variables are age (in quadratic 
form) and gender of respondent, socio-religious identity, traits of household head 
(gender, education and occupation).  
 
3. FINDINGS 
3.1 SES, hospitalization and insurance coverage 
The extent to which individual access to inpatient services and access to health insurance 
varies acoss different expenditure classes may be seen graphically (Fig. 1). It appears that 
use of hospitalization services is around eight percent for the lowest three quintile 
expenditure groups, after which it decreases slightly. Coverage under all insurance 
schemes and specifically under private insurance, however, increases over the quintile 
groups. 
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Fig. 1: Variation in percentage hospitalized, covered under 
insurance & covered under private insurance by 
expenditure quintile
0
2
4
6
8
10
Poorest Poor Middle Rich Richest
Hospitalization Insurance Private Insurance
 
 
The extent to which access to hospital services and insurance coverage is equitable may 
be measured using a concentration index suggested by Kakwani et al., (1997). For 
utilization of hospital services, the value of the index is -0.02, while its value is 0.31 for 
access to any type of insurance and 0.51 for access to private insurance. While a negative 
value of the concentration index (as estimated for for hospitalization) normally implies 
that it is the poor who tend to use such sevices, in this case the absolute value is very 
small indicating that use is ‘equitable’. The positive (and  high) value of the index for 
insurance indicates that, ironically, it is the well-off (and less vulnerable) households who 
are covered by health insurance policies. 
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Fig. 2: Estimate of extent of progressiveness in access to 
hospital services and insurance coverage using 
Kakwani’s index
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Analysis of proportion of persons seeking hospitalization services, or covered under 
insurance (both any and private) also yields similar results. While there is no clear pattern 
for usage of hospitlaization services, coverage under insurance is higher among families 
headed by more educated heads (Fig. 3). Kakwani’s index 0.03 (hospitalization) also 
indicate lack of any clear relationship between hospitalization and education. In case of 
insurance coverage, however, we find a high degree of inequity (0.53, any insurance and 
0.57, private insurance). 
 
Fig. 3: Variation in percentage hospitalized, covered under 
insurance & covered under private insurance by education 
of household head 
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The pattern of hospitalization and insurance coverage may also be expected to vary 
across occupational categories. While the proportion of respondents hospitalized varies 
across occupational categories, no clear pattern is seen (Fig. 4). It is highest among 
families headed by persons in the residual category, followed by service sector workers, 
clerks and professionals. Insurance coverage is high among in the formal sector — 
particularly among clerks, professionals and administrators; private insurance, however, 
is mainly restricted to families headed by professionals and administrators. 
Fig. 4: Variation in percentage hospitalized, covered under 
insurance & covered under private insurance by 
occupation of household head
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The above analysis, however, is indicative as it does not control for variables like supply-
side factors, individual traits (like age), and household characteristics (like socio-religious 
identity, household size, etc.). This calls for multivariate analysis to which we turn to in 
the next section. 
 
3.2 Multi-variate analysis — With and without compliances 
We have estimated two models regressing whether the respondent was hospitalized on 
SES — a single equation model without compliances, and a second model including 
compliances, which was estimated using two stage least square. Results of the model are 
reported in Table 2. It can be seen that results are very similar for both models. 
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It was expected that the demand for health care, like any other commodity demand, 
should depend positively on the patient’s ability to pay (proxied by household 
expenditure levels, LPCE). In both models, the coefficient of log of per capita income 
(LPCE) is positive and significant at 1% level.  
 
The other proxies for SES were education and occupation. Interestingly, we find an 
inverse U-shape between education of household head and usage of hospital services. 
This may be explained as follows. Less educated household heads are less aware of the 
need for hospitalization (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997); their economic capability to 
bear hospitalization expenses is also low.11 At the other end, educated household heads 
(with more than Secondary level of education) are more aware (Behrman and Wolfe, 
1982; Pal, 1999; Henderson, 2002), but as they live in better conditions12 they are less 
exposed to health hazards and require less in-patient services. 
 
Except for HMANF, coefficients of other occupation dummies are significant at either 
1% or 5% level. Moreover, all coefficients are negative, indicating that probability of 
using inpatient services is higher among service holders (the reference category). This 
may reflect their lower purchasing power — mean income of heads working in the 
service or manufacturing sector (Rs. 52050 and Rs.49706, respectively) is lower than that 
of other sectors (combined mean of Rs.62545). 
      
Table 2: Regression results of Hospitalization on SES – With and without 
compliances 
Without compliances With compliances 
Variables 
OR z Prob OR z Prob 
PREDBINS    3.79 2.42 0.02 
LPCE 1.14 5.10 0.00 1.10 3.39 0.00 
                                               
11  Mean annual income of illiterate headed households — Rs.47,708, 23 percent below mean annual 
income of sample —  is lower than that of other households 
12 Factor score of living environment for households headed by secondary and higher level heads are 73 
and 81 respectively, compared to sample average of 62. 
 18 
Without compliances With compliances 
Variables 
OR z Prob OR z Prob 
HBPRIM (Ref) 1.00   1.00   
HILLIT 0.80 -6.10 0.00 0.80 -6.22 0.00 
HPRIM 0.94 -1.86 0.06 0.94 -1.92 0.06 
HSEC 0.94 -1.78 0.08 0.94 -1.93 0.05 
HHSEC 0.85 -4.17 0.00 0.83 -4.66 0.00 
HSERVICE (Ref) 1.00   1.00   
HPROF 0.87 -2.75 0.01 0.86 -2.86 0.00 
HADMIN 0.88 -2.61 0.01 0.86 -2.98 0.00 
HCLERK 0.90 -2.15 0.03 0.90 -2.13 0.03 
HSALES 0.86 -3.41 0.00 0.85 -3.56 0.00 
HPSECTOR 0.92 -1.64 0.10 0.92 -1.66 0.10 
HMANF 0.95 -1.16 0.25 0.95 -1.29 0.20 
HOTHERS 0.79 -4.31 0.00 0.78 -4.38 0.00 
NLENV 1.00 -0.33 0.75 1.00 -0.09 0.93 
AGE 1.02 44.37 0.00 1.02 43.81 0.00 
MALE (Ref) 1.00   1.00   
FEMALE 0.95 -2.69 0.01 0.95 -2.52 0.01 
HSCST (Ref) 1.00   1.00   
HUC 0.89 -3.50 0.00 0.88 -3.60 0.00 
OBC 0.94 -1.87 0.06 0.94 -1.90 0.06 
MUSLIM 0.97 -0.74 0.46 0.98 -0.65 0.52 
OSRC 0.91 -2.11 0.04 0.91 -2.24 0.03 
HHSIZE 0.91 -18.60 0.00 0.91 -16.44 0.00 
HFEMALE 1.04 0.97 0.33 1.04 0.98 0.33 
PCBEDS 1.00 4.30 0.00 1.00 4.29 0.00 
Observations 132417   132417   
LR χ2 2772.59  0.00 2778.14  0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.04   0.04   
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Thus, contrary to literature (Mincer, 1974; Somers, 1986; Pappas et al., 1993; Guralnik et 
al., 1993), we find that the health-SES gradient persists even if we introduce compliances 
in to our model. One reason may be the low insurance coverage in India (GOI, 2004). 
Moreover, SES may remain an issue due to the complete or partial withdrawal of 
“cashless insurance cover” because of problems like co-insurance, co-payment etc.13 
However, the value of the LPCE coefficient falls slightly from 1.14 to 1.10.  
 
The coefficient of predicted BINS (probability of purchasing insurance) in the model 
with compliances is positive and significant.14 This implies that insurance policy holders 
are more likely to seek hospitalization services, indicating the presence of a moral hazard 
problem. Note that, this model shows the existence of the double moral hazard, it does 
not distinguish between moral hazard on the part of the patient, and moral hazard on the 
part of the physician. 
 
Research has established that the environment in which a person lives has a strong 
influence on morbidity, mortality and other indicators of health (Corvalán et al., 1999; 
Karn et al., 2003; Maas et al., 2009; Berg et al., 2010). The coefficient of living 
environment (NLENV) is insignificant. This result, however, merely reflects the strong 
correlation between LPCE and NLENV (0.4761). 
 
Age of respondent is positively related to the incidence of hospitalization as theorized. 
This corroborates results of theoretical studies that as health capital depreciates with age, 
demand for hospital care increases (Zweifel et al., 2009; Grossman, 1972a).  
 
Female members have lower probability of being hospitalized compared to their male 
counterparts. This supports the view that there exists a bias against females in medical 
care. Social restrictions on mobility of women - in particular, constraints on overnight 
                                               
13 In 2010, for instance, major health insurance companies in India announced the withdrawal of cashless 
hospitalization facilities to policy holders as private sector hospitals were overcharging patients. 
14 The first step model is, in brief: BINS = 0.00001 LOSSHHI (+ other control variables). LR χ2 is 2662.54 
(p=0.00). LOSSHHI has a t-ratio of 1.62. 
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stay outside the home - are important. Another possible explanation is that men suffer 
from life style related ailments like, drinking, smoking, stress, overeating (Henderson, 
2002) and hence require more medical care. Moreover, in developing countries men are 
more ‘valuable’ in terms of financial contributions to the family, compared to women, 
and hence are more likely to be taken to the hospital when ill (Cohen, 1998; Todaro, 
2002). 
 
Compared to HSC&STs, all other socio-religious communities (except Muslims) have 
lower hospitalization usage. The lower usage of hospital services by SCs and STS reflect 
their economic vulnerability,15 rather than living in healthy environment.16 Despite havng 
higher levels of annual household expenditure (Rs.58952) and factor scores for living 
environment (57) than SCs and STs, usage of inpatient services by Muslims does not 
differ significantly from SCs and STs. This may reflect lack of access to health services 
(GOI, 2006). 
 
Although gender of the household head may also become an important factor determining 
use of hospital services (Ngugi, 1999; Hausmann-Muela et al. 2003, Mukherjee et al., 
2011), we do not find this HFEMALE to be significant in our analysis.   
 
We have used number of beds per 1,00,000 persons in the state as a proxy for availability 
of health care facilities. The coefficient of per capita availability of inpatient health care 
facilities is positive and significant, indicating that greater availability of such facilities 
leads to higher levels of usage of such services. 
 
3.3 Detecting adverse selection 
In the next two-stage model we test for the presence of adverse selection. Results reveal 
that the coefficient of HOSP is significant at 1% level and is positive (Table 3).17 This 
                                               
15 Mean income of SCs and STs are Rs. 52475 and Rs.47564 (combined mean Rs.4832) is lower than that 
of Upper Castes (Rs.75078), OBCs (Rs.53647) and OSRCs (Rs.72889). 
16 Normalized factor score for living environment is 47 for both SCs and STs, against 73 (HUCs), 57 
(HOBCs) and 64 (OSRCs). 
17 The first step model is: HOSP = -1.48 HSTAT15 + 0.00004 PCBEDS (+ Other control variables). LR χ2 
is 6038.34 (p=0.00). HSTAT15 and PCBEDS have t-ratios of -60.68 (significant at 1% level) and 2.14 
(significant at 5% level), respectively. 
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implies that respondents who expect to be hospitalized are more likely to purchase health 
insurance, indicating the presence of adverse selection. 
 
Table 3: Results of Regression Model of Insurance: Detecting Adverse Selection 
Variables Odd Ratio z Prob. 
PREDHOSP 6.90 4.72 0.00 
LPCE 4.83 25.69 0.00 
HBPRIM (Ref) 1.00   
HILLIT 0.57 -2.83 0.01 
HPRIM 0.97 -0.21 0.83 
HSEC 1.62 4.33 0.00 
HHSEC 2.32 7.45 0.00 
HSERVICE (Ref) 1.00   
HPROF 3.23 4.97 0.00 
HADMIN 4.49 6.44 0.00 
HCLERK 2.55 3.90 0.00 
HSALES 3.59 5.44 0.00 
HPSECTOR 1.51 1.34 0.18 
HMANF 2.59 3.98 0.00 
HOTHER 2.64 3.80 0.00 
AGE 1.04 7.38 0.00 
SAGE 0.99 -6.65 0.00 
MALE (Ref) 1.00   
FEMALE 0.79 -4.07 0.00 
HSC&ST (Ref) 1.00   
HUC 1.79 4.04 0.00 
OBC 1.63 3.19 0.00 
MUSLIM 0.54 -2.87 0.00 
OSRC 2.27 5.27 0.00 
HHSIZE 0.78 -15.51 0.00 
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Variables Odd Ratio z Prob. 
HMALE (Ref) 1.00   
HFEMALE 0.92 -0.69 0.49 
LOSSHHI 1.00 1.29 0.20 
Observations 132417   
LR χ2 2719.71  0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.18   
 
Socio-economic status is found to be a significant predictor of decision to purchase 
insurance. Respondents coming from families with high expenditure levels or headed by 
more educated heads are more likely to purchase insurance. In the case of occupation, we 
find that all coefficients, barring that of HPSECTOR, are significant at 1% level. This 
implies that if the family head is an professional, administrator, clerk, salesman, 
manufacturing sector worker or falls in the residual category, (s)he is more lilkley to be 
covered under insurance than if (s)he comes from a family headed by a service sector 
worker. In particular, respondents from families headed by administrators, salesmen and 
professionals are most likely to seek insurance cover.  
 
Female respondents are less likely to be covered under health insurance; the probability 
of being insured increases wth age, but not linearly. Muslims are averse towards 
acquiring health insurance; in contrast, HUCs, HOBCs and OSRCs are more likely to 
purchase insurance than HSCSTs. The odd ratio of HHSIZE is less than unity — this may 
be because larger households are less likley to have resources to purchase insurance. 
LOSSHHO and gender of household head are both insignificant at 10% level. 
 
3.4 Variations across socio-economic status 
Finally, we compare the magitude of coefficients of (predicted) BINS and (predicted) 
HOSP across expenditure classes and education levels. This will give us an idea of how 
the strength of moral hazard and adverse selection varies over these two variables.  
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For this exercise, we have re-estimated the earlier equations after adding slope dummies 
for expenditure and education levels, respectively. The equation for HOSP is given 
below: 
 
HOSP = α + β PREDBINS + γ1SD1 + γ2SD2 + γ4SD4 + γ5SD5 + δ Control Variables 
when SDi = PREDHOSP if respondent is from ith quintile 
       = 0 otherwise. 
Similarly we construct equations for INSURANCE and incorporate slope dummies for 
educational levels in these two equations. 
Fig. 5: Variation of coefficients of HOSP and BINS 
across expenditure groups
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It can be seen that tendency of insured people to seek in patient care (moral hazard) is 
lower for respondents beloninging to higher expenditure classes (Fig. 5). This is in line 
with earlier studies of health insurance in developing countries (Jowitt et al., 2004). With 
respect to the tendency to purchase insurance, however, we find that it is the fourth — 
and particularly the fifth — quintile that displays adverse selection. This has interesting 
implications as this economic class is not only the least economically vulnerable but also 
may drive up the insurance price beyond the ability of the lower quintiles. 
 
Now, one important problem in interpreting the coefficient in the HOSP equation as 
indicative of the presence of moral hazard is that it may simply reflect greater awareness 
of the importance of health as a capital. This may be checked by examining the variation 
of coeffiecients of pobability of seeking in-patient care over educational levels. 
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Fig. 6: Variation of coefficients of HOSP and BINS 
across education levels
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Fig. 6, however, negates this possbility as we find that tendency to seek in patient care 
decreases at higher levels of education. This supports our initial suspicion that moral 
hazard is present in the Indian health market. However, likelihood of seeking insurance 
coverage increases with educational levels. Note that this does not negate the possible 
presence of adverse selection.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper analyzes the nature of usage of inpatient services among Indian households. In 
the absence of any compliance from the patient’s side, SES is found to be strongly 
influencing her decision to seek hospital care. The role of demographic factors and living 
environment is mostly in line with our expectations and knowledge developed from the 
literature. In contrast to literature, however, SES remains an important determinant of 
hospitalization usage even in the presence of compliances. This implies that the health 
insurance market in India is not being able to eliminate the inequities in seeking health 
care services substantially by providing coverage to those most in need of it. It is true 
that, in urban areas, the health-SES gradient does become less steeper, but the decrease is 
not marked – odd ratio of LPCE falls from 1.14 in the absence of compliances to 1.10 
after introducing compliances. There may be two reasons for this. One is the failure of 
the state to provide health coverage to the poorer households. Secondly, the linking of tax 
rebates to investment in health insurance policies encourages relatively affluent 
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households to purchase health insurance, pervasively increasing existing equities in the 
health care market. The impact of these two forces is to make insurance coverage highly 
regressive, indicated by the value of Kakwani’s concentration index (0.51). 
 
Another problem is the presence of adverse selection, leading to further distortions in 
market equilibrium. Asymmetric information leads to two types of problems. Firstly, 
results show that persons who believe that they may be hospitalized in the future are 
more likely to purchase insurance, indicating the presence of adverse selection. Secondly, 
the presence of insurance coverage significantly affects the decision to be hospitalized, 
leading to more claims. Both these effects create an upward pressure on the price of 
insurance, thereby further pushing health insurance beyond the reach of the poorer 
sections of the community. This is concerning, in terms of ability to access health 
facilities and high out of pocket expenditure and their long term impact on equity, 
economic vulnerability and health outcomes. Our findings call for a re-examination of 
health and allied markets in India, and seek ways to providing coverage to vulnerable 
sections of the community.  
 
The Report of the Committee on Health Survey and Development (chaired by Sir Jospeh 
Bhore) had recommended in as early as 1946 that the state should take full responsibility 
for providing preventive and curative services to all Indians. This had been shelved, and 
health pushed back in the priority list of central and state governments in favour of 
industrialization-based economic growth. This has led to low government spending on 
health sector (4.17% in 2009, compared to a global average of 10%), producing some of 
the poorest health outcomes in the world.18 In recent years, schemes like the Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana, Yeswasini and Aarogyasri has been introduced, but with little 
                                               
18 In India, 52.7% of births are attended by skilled health workers (against 65.3% for the world); maternal 
mortality rate is 26% (against 23.0% for the world); infant mortality rate  is 47.6% (against 41.61% for the 
world); child mortality rate is 62.7% (against 57.9% for the world); 66% of children aged 12-23 are 
immunized for DPT (against 82.0% for the world);  life expectancy is 64.8 years (against 69.4 years for the 
world). Data is given for last year for which data is available in respective databases. Sources: (for infant 
mortality rate) http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=29&c=xx&l=en, and (for all other indicators) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator accessed on 12 December 2011. 
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impact (Aggarwal, 2010).19 The recent report of the High Level Expert Group (HLEG) 
on Universal Health Coverage for India (GOI, 2011) too calls upon the state to provide 
“affordable, accountable, appropriate health services of assured quality … with the 
government being the guarantor and enabler, although not necessarily the only provider 
…” (GOI, 2011: 9). Our findings indicate that when universal health coverage is 
introduced, this may create moral hazard, leading to a massive upsurge in demand for 
health care facilities. Implementing this recommendation will, therefore, require a 
complete overhaul of the health sector, incorporating aspects like remodeling healthcare 
institutions, establishing infrastructure to create human resources in health, delineating 
protocols for treatment, providing medicines and finding resources to fund this massive 
exercise. The last is particularly important as the HLEG estimates that public spending on 
health will have to jump from the current 1.2% of GDP to 3% of GDP in 2022. 
Moreover, implementing this scheme will have to face opposition from vested interests in 
the health sector. Whether the Indian government will be able to rise to this challenge, 
therefore, is something that has to be seen in the future. 
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19 Shahrawat and Rao (2012) points out that schemes like RSBY cover only inpatient expenditure, while 
expenditure on drugs are the main cause of impoverishment, comprising the chunk of OOP in India (82 
percent for outpatients, 42 percent for inpatients). 
 27 
Appendix 
Table A1: Socio-Economic Profile of the Respondents (as % of urban population) 
Household Head Respondent Household 
Gender of Head Gender of respondent Household size 
Male 90.47 Male 51.13 1-3 members 11.8 
Female 9.53 Female 48.87 4 members 17.00 
Occupation of Head Age of respondent 5 members 19.00 
Professional 8.84 0-6 years 13.82 6 members 16.38 
Administrative 11.13 7-18 years 23.2 7 members 11.22 
Clerical 9.74 19-30 years 23.32 8 or more members 24.60 
Sales 17.71 31-45 years 19.73 Socio-religious identity 
Service 7.67 46-59 years 10.45 H-UC 32.44 
Primary 7.98 60 years & above 9.48 H-ST 2.00 
Production 31.54 Health status of respondent H-SC 12.68 
Unclassified 5.39 Ailing 10.28 H-OBC 26.77 
Education of head Not ailing 89.75 Muslims 16.43 
No formal education 21.45 Insurance coverage Others 9.68 
Primary, or less 22.36 Public insurance 1.87 
Middle 17.37 Private insurance 0.99 
Quality of living 
environment 
Secondary & Hr Sec 22.62 No coverage 97.14  Worst (0-20)  10.40       
Above HS 16.19      Poor (21-40)  13.58       
     Middle (41-60)  16.22       
    Good (61-80) 23.14       
    Best (81-100) 36.66      
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